

Message Text

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R 102045Z JAN 74
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8961
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
AMEMBASSY DACCA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 NEW DELHI 0508

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CINCPAC

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, IR, PK
SUBJECT: ARMS POLICY

1. I AM STRUCK BY THE CLARITY AND FORCEFULNESS OF AMBASSADOR
BYROADE'S RECENT CABLES CONCERNING ARMS TO PAKISTAN, AND
EQUALLY, PERHAPS, BY THE RELATIVE INFREQUENCY WITH WHICH
WE ALL DISCUSS SUCH MATTERS. I AM DISPOSED TO THINK THE
TIME IS AT HAND FOR A MUCH MORE EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE.

2. IN OFFERING SOME COMMENTS FROM NEW DELHI, LET ME
FIRST ADMIN TO AN OLD PREJUDICE MUCH REINFORCED BY MY
EXPERIENCE OF SOUTH ASIA. I AM VERY MUCH IN FAVOR OF
ARMING THE UNITED STATES. I AM NOT NOW, NOR EVER HAVE BEEN,
ATTRACTED BY THE PROSPECT OF ARMING, REARMING, OR FOR
THAT MATTER DISARMING ANYBODY IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD.
THIS DISPOSITION CAN BE READILY ACCOUNTED FOR. I TRUST
THE UNITED STATES. I DO NOT TRUST ANY OF THESE BASTARDS.
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I TAKE THEM COLLECTIVELY AT THEIR OWN ASSESSMENT OF ONE
ANOTHER.

3. IT MAY SEEM ODD TO SPEAK OF ARMING THE UNITED STATES,

BUT IT SEEMS TO ME AT HOME WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO FACE UP TO AN ISSUE ALMOST OF THIS ORDER. ONE CANNOT HAVE WATCHED THE BUDGETARY AND FORCE LEVEL TRENDS OF THE PAST FOUR YEARS WITHOUT GROWING CONCERN, AND MOST ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO OUR STRENGTH AT SEA. I REMARKED THREE YEARS AGO TO THE PRESIDENT THAT WE PRACTICALLY NEEDED A NEW NAVY. NOTHING SINCE HAS CHANGED MY MIND, NOT LEAST AS WE ARE EXPANDING THE NAVY'S RESPONSIBILITIES. IT IS CLEAR IS IT NOT, THAT WE ARE WELL INTO A FAMILIAR ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS OF MAKING A LARGE MILITARY DECISION BY SMALL INCREMENTS SUCH AS DO NOT DISTURB THE OVERLY TIMID. WE ARE GOING TO ESTABLISH A PERMANENT NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. IN SOME RESPECTS WE HAVE ALREADY DONE SO. I FOR ONE AM CONCERNED AS TO HOW EFFECTIVE THAT PRESENCE WILL BE. I DON'T THINK IT WILL HAVE THE EFFECT WE DESIRE IF OUR FLOTILLA CONSISTS OF A SUCCESSION OF WORLD WAR II CARRIERS SENT WHEEZING UP THE STRAITS OF MALACCA EVERY MONTH OR SO, MANNING THE PUMPS ALL THE WAY.

4. IT IS SURELY EQUALLY CLEAR THAT THE NEW DISPOSITION OF NAVAL FORCES INTO THE INDIAN OCEAN IS GOING TO TAKE PLACE WELL IN ADVANCE OF, AND WITHOUT BENEFIT OF, ANY ENHANCEMENT OF OUR OVERALL NAVAL STRENGTH. ACCORDINGLY THE POLITICAL TASK OF PREPARING THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA TO ACCEPT THIS NEW STRATEGIC ASSERTION BY US WILL INVOLVE A MORE THAN NORMALLY TAXING DEPLOYMENT OF OUR DIPLOMATIC STRENGTH. I WOULD TEND TO THINK THEREFORE THAT ANY DECISIONS ABOUT ARMS TO THE SUBCONTINENT SHOULD BE MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS IMMEDIATE AND DIRECT CONCERN OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY. IN PRACTICE, I EXPECT INDIA'S IS THE REACTION WE MUST THINK ABOUT FIRST. SHE STILL THINKS THE BLOODY OCEAN IS NAMED AFTER HER. PAKISTAN WILL NOT LIKELY COMPLAIN ABOUT AN INCREASE IN AMERICAN FORCES IN HER NEIGHBORHOOD. NEPAL AND AFGHANISTAN ARE LANDLOCKED. BANGLADESH IS PREOCCUPIED WITH THE BAY OF BENGAL. SRI LANKA WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE HEARD FROM--
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THE "ZONE OF PEACE" IS THEIR IDEA---- BUT I EXPECT WE CAN LIVE WITH IT. WE WILL NOT BASE OUR INDIAN OCEAN OR GLOBAL NAVAL STRATEGY ON INDIA'S REACTION, NOR WOULD ANY SANE MAN THINK WE SHOULD. BUT OBVIOUSLY WE WILL BEST SERVE OUR STRATEGIC INTERESTS IF THE PRINCIPAL POWERS OF THIS REGION ARE TOLERABLY ACQUIESCENT IN WHAT WE DO. TO REPEAT, INDIA CERTAINLY CAN'T KEEP US OUT OF THE INDIAN OCEAN, AND, SHOULD IT OBJECT, THERE IS NO QUESTION IN MY MIND BUT THAT WE WILL PROCEED AS PLANNED ANYHOW. BUT THE FACT IS THAT INDIA HAS REFRAINED FROM CAUSING TROUBLE ABOUT OUR DEPLOYMENTS SO FAR IN ORDER TO PRESERVE A DEVELOPING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US WHICH INDIA CLEARLY DESIRES. FURTHERMORE, ALTHOUGH INDIA COULD NOT PREVENT

OUR DEPLOYMENT -- IT WOULD NEED MORE THAN THAT RUSTING CARRIER IN BOMBAY TO DO THAT-- IT COULD CAUSE QUITE A FUSS, MUCH MORE THAN ANY OF THE OTHER LITTORAL NATIONS. MY POINT IS THAT WITH THINGS AS THEY ARE NOW, WE HAVE A FAIR CHANCE OF CONTAINING THE INDIAN REACTION. IF WE REVIVE A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN WE HAVE NONE. AT A CERTAIN REMOVE, WE INVITE FURTHER SOVIET EXPANSION SOUTHWARD. AND THEN THE CHINESE.

5. WITH RESPECT TO THE OLD PAKISTAN-INDIA ISSUE, I QUITE AGREE THAT OUR ANALYSIS SHOULD BEGIN WITH THE MILITARY ARITHMETIC OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. HERE WE COME UPON A QUITE STRIKING ANOMALY: ON THE ONE HAND PAKISTAN IS SURPRISINGLY CLOSE TO PARITY WITH INDIA IN CRITICAL AREAS OF MILITARY STRENGTH. ON THE OTHER HAND, PAKISTAN IS PERMANENTLY AND IRREVERSIBLY OUTCLASSED BY INDIA. IN TANKS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE STRENGTH OF THE TWO FORCES IS ABOUT EVEN. ON THE OTHER HAND, INDIA MAKES ITS OWN TANKS. AS GOOD AS ANY IN THE WORLD, CERTAINLY AS GOOD AS ANY PAKISTAN IS EVER LIKELY TO GET. AND, WHAT IS MORE, MAKES A HUNDRED OF THEM A YEAR. SINCE THE 1971 WAR PAKISTAN HAS RAISED FOUR NEW DIVISIONS, AND FACES INDIA WITH A STRENGTH EQUAL TO ITS PREWAR LEVEL, THOUGH WITH ONLY

HALF A COUNTRY TO DEFEND. ON THE OTHER HAND, INDIA IS A NUCLEAR NATION WHICH WITH EASE COULD BECOME A NUCLEAR POWER. AS I SAY IT IS ALL RATHER ANOMALOUS, ALBEIT PERFECTLY CLEAR. INDIA IS BEGINNING TO REAP THE REWARDS OF CONFIDENTIAL

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A LONG POLICY OF INSISTING ON SELF-RELIANCE AND HEAVY INVESTMENT IN AN ARMAMENTS INDUSTRY. PAKISTAN IS BEGINNING TO PAY THE COST OF SMALL SIZE AND RESOURCES AND DEPENDENCE ON SUPER POWER PATRONS. THE UNITED STATES, AS AMBASSADOR BYROADE WRITES, HAS AS A MATTER OF POLICY NOT SHIPPED ARMS TO THEM FOR EIGHT YEARS NOW. THE CHINESE STUFF ISN'T THAT GOOD. THE FRENCH WANT CASH. THE RUSSIANS AREN'T AS HELPFUL AS THEY ONCE LOOKED TO BE, AND SEEM ONLY TO BE SENDING SPARE PARTS, A L'AMERICAIN.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CINCPAC.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W
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R 101625Z JAN 74
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
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INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 NEW DELHI 0508

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CINCPAC

6. THESE OVERWHELMING FIRST ORDER REALITIES HAVE LED THE SECRETARY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS TO STATE THAT INDIA IS A WORLD POWER, BUT PAKISTAN CAN AT MOST BE A REGIONAL POWER. THIS, I ASSUME, IS WHAT LED THE PRESIDENT TO SAY TO ME LAST SEPTEMBER THAT WE WOULD BE QTE MAD UNQTE TO REARM PAKISTAN.

7. THERE IS A SECOND ORDER REALITY WHICH IS MUCH IN MY MIND, ALTHOUGH I COULD NOT PRESUME TO ASCRIBE IT TO ANY ONE ELSE. IT IS THAT THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE ASIAN SUBCONTINENT ARE PAINFULLY FEW. I USE THIS TERM SIMPLY BECAUSE IT IS IN FACT PAINFUL FOR MANY PERSONS IN INDIA AND AT HOME TO HAVE TO FACE UP TO THIS REALITY AFTER TWO DECADES OF WILDLY EXAGGERATED ASSERTIONS OF THE CRITICAL NATURE OF AMERICAN INTERESTS OUT HERE. I DON'T KNOW QUITE HOW WE GOT INTO THE ARMAMENTS BUSINESS. TOWNSEND HOOPELS WOULD HAVE US BELIEVE IT WAS BECAUSE FOSTER DULLES HAD THIS THING GOING WITH GOD. MAYBE SO. AS FOR SAVING DEMOCRACY AND VINDICATING FABIAN SOCIALISM, I SUSPECT THIS WAS MORE AN INITIATIVE OF THE ACADEMY THAN OF THE CONFIDENTIAL

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WALL STREET LAW FIRMS, BUT EQUALLY UNREAL IN ITS UNDERSTANDING OF THE LIMITS OF SUCH POSSIBILITIES AS BETWEEN A NATION SUCH AS OURS AND THE NATIONS OF SOUTH ASIA. BOTH ENTERPRISES HAVE ENDED IN BITTERNESS AND DISILLUSION, WITH ASSORTED DEAD BUREAUCRACIES IN BOTH COUNTRIES. HAVING GONE THROUGH ALL THAT WE ARE SURELY NOT GOING TO START THE WHOLE CYCLE OVER AGAIN. I REFER THOSE WHO MIGHT BE SO TEMPTED TO MARX'S DICTUM ON THE NAPOLEONS: FIRST TIME TRAGEDY, SECOND TIME FARCE.

8. WHAT WE SEEK IN SOUTH ASIA IS STABILITY. OF NECESSITY STABILITY IF IT IS ACHIEVED, WILL IN THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE, BE BASED ON THE FACT OF INDIAN POWER. (NOTE. IN THE FIRST DRAFT OF THIS MESSAGE I USED THE WORD HEGEMONY. DAVID SCHNEIDER URGED ME NOT TO DO SO ON GROUNDS THAT ALL OVER WASHINGTON

THERE ARE PEOPLE WHO WILL BITTERLY RESENT THIS TERM, AND SEE IT AS THE NEW DELHI EMBASSY TALKING UP INDIA. I HAVE ACCORDINGLY DELETED HEGEMONY. BUT I WOULD ADD THAT THIS MUST MEAN THERE ARE PEOPLE ALL OVER WASHINGTON WHO CANNOT LIVE WITH THE REALITIES OF SOUTH ASIA. BAD FRAME OF MIND IN WHICH TO MAKE FOREIGN POLICY. I HASTEN TO ADD THAT THIS INDIAN PREDOMINANCE IS NONE OF MY DOING. IT WAS HERE WHEN I ARRIVED. IT WILL BE HERE WHEN I DEPART. I NEITHER LIKE NOR DISLIKE IT: APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE IT.) THAT THE LEADERS OF NEIGHBORING SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES WILL NEVER ADMIT TO THE INDIAN PREDOMINANCE DOES NOT RENDER IT ANY LESS THE REALITY, NOR DOES OUR OCCASIONAL WISH THAT IT WEREN'T SO RENDER IT ANY LESS THE PREMISE THAT UNDERLIES EVERY RECENT STATEMENT OF AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD THE SUB-CONTINENT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S 1973 FOREIGN POLICY REPORT ON DOWN. WE SHOULD NOT BE SO UNHAPPY. THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTH ASIA ARE ECONOMIC, NOT POLITICAL, AND ONLY WITH A LONG PERIOD OF PEACE, MEANING MORE THAN JUST THE ABSENCE OF WAR, THERE ANY HOPE OF AVERTING THE MASS CALAMITIES THAT ARE NOW AWAITING THIS PART OF THE WORLD IN THE 1980S. SUCH A PEACE PROBABLY CAN ONLY COME FROM THE EMERGENCE OF ONE BIG REGIONAL POWER THAT IS NONETHELESS PREOCCUPIED WITH ITS OWN DEVELOPMENT. TO ACHIEVE SUCH A PEACE INDIA WILL HAVE TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR HER SMALLER NEIGHBORS TO REMAIN INDEPENDENT AND INTACT AND REASONABLY PROSPEROUS. THIS WILL NOT BE EASY ANYWHERE, BUT IT CAN BE DONE, AND THERE IS AT LEAST SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE INDIANS SEE IT THIS WAY. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THIS PAST YEAR I HAVE BEEN SENT IN TO TELL THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS THAT INDIA

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SURELY MUST UNDERSTAND THAT ANYTHING CONTRIBUTING TO INSTABILITY IN PAKISTAN IS A THREAT TO THE STABILITY OF THE WHOLE REGION. NO ONE IN WASHINGTON WILL BE SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT THE MINISTER AGREED WITH ME, BUT IT IS ALSO THE FACT THAT INDIA HAS PRETTY MUCH BEHAVED THIS WAY.

9. THERE IS A SPECIFIC HERE. DURING THE COURSE OF THE 1971 WAR A STRONG MOVE GREW UP WITHIN THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT TO FINISH OFF PAKISTAN ONCE AND FOR ALL. IN THE MILITARY ESTIMATES OF THIS EMBASSY, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO PROBLEM DOING SO. MRS. GANDHI --TO HEAR HER ACCOUNT -- STRONGLY RESISTED THIS PROPOSAL, AND HAD HER WAY. CERTAINLY NO INVASION OF THE WEST OCCURRED. SHE IS IMMENSELY PROUD OF THIS FACT (OR ASSERTED FACT.) IN THE COURSE OF THEIR RECENT VISIT WITH HER, SENATOR AND MRS. COOPER ALLUDED TO THESE EVENTS, AND ELICITED FROM THE PRIME MINISTER QUITE THE STRONGEST RESPONSE OF ANYTHING SAID IN THE COURSE OF THE AFTERNOON. ALL I MEAN TO SAY IS THAT THE RECORD SUGGESTS THAT INDIA HAS NO FURTHER DESIGNS ON PAKISTAN AND, INDEED, THAT INDIA SEES BHUTTO AS MUCH TO BE PREFERRED TO ANY LIKELY ALTERNATIVE AS LEADER OF PAKISTAN.

10. AS FOR PAKISTAN, FOLLOWING A SHARP MILITARY DEFEAT, IT HAS MANAGED TO REARM WITHOUT DIRECT AMERICAN AID. WE CONTINUE

TO GIVE PAKISTAN CONSIDERABLE SUMS OF AID. OR HAVE DONE SO UNTIL RECENTLY. AID IN MONEY OR IN KIND IS MILITARY AID IF THE RECIPIENT WISHES IT TO BE. PAKISTAN HAS ONLY TO USE OUR AID IN THE PLACE OF RESOURCES OTHERWISE OBLIGATED, AND USE THE RESOURCES THEREBY FREED TO BUY ARMS WHEREVER THEY ARE FOR SALE. ON THIS POINT I WOULD NOTE A CONSIDERABLE DISPARITY BETWEEN AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH THE TWO COUNTRIES. AID TO INDIA HAS COME TO AN END. MAYBE JUST AS WELL. SOMEBODY IN CONGRESS HAS TURNED THE WHOLE OPERATION INTO A COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM. (ONE IS REMINDED OF THE NOT INACCURATE REMARK THAT MRS. ROOSEVELT REGARDED THE WORLD AS ONE LARGE SLUM PROJECT.) BUT I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE FOR THE RECORD THAT I HAVE JUST BEEN INFORMED THAT IN FISCAL YEAR 1974 THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT HAS PUT ASIDE FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS FOR UPLIFTING THE FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY MILLION PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA. THAT'S WHAT I SAID. FIVE HUNDRED GRAND FOR THE SECOND LARGEST COUNTRY IN THE WORLD. SOMETHING LESS THAN ONE MIL PER CAPITA. IT MAY SEEM FUNNY TO YOU PEOPLE
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SITTING AT SAFE AND COMFORTABLE DESKS IN WASHINGTON, BUT I REMIND YOU THAT I HAVE GOT ONE DAY TO RETURN TO HARVARD UNIVERSITY AND ACCOUNT FOR MY STEWARDSHIP TO JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH.

11. IN THE MEANTIME BE ASSURED THAT WE ARE ALL IN GOOD SPIRITS OUT HERE. ALL WE ASK IS THAT YOU SEND US A MAN FOR BANGLADESH, SO WE CAN CONFRONT YOU WITH A SOLID FRONT OF INFORMED AND DETERMINED VIEWS. YOU COULD ALSO HELP A BIT BY SAVING ENERGY ON THE RUMOR CIRCUIT. WE HAVE JUST LEARNED TO OUR ASTONISHMENT AND RELIEF THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE AFTER ALL NOT SHIPPED --WHAT WAS THE FIGURE?--EIGHTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY MONSTER TANKS TO AFGHANISTAN. THE ONES NOW ARRIVING WERE ORDERED BY THE OLD KING, GOD BLESS HIM, THREE YEARS AGO. I WOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE THAT THE GUY WHO TOUTED US ON TO THAT ONE BE ADVISED THAT HIS FEE SCHEDULE FOR THE COMING FISCAL YEAR IS BEING REVISED DOWNWARDS.

12. I AM LOOKING FORWARDHO A FEW DAYS IN ISLAMABAD WITH AMBASSADOR BYROADE WEEK AFTER NEXT, WHERE WE WILL CONTINUE OUR DISCUSSION. DISCUSSION I REPEAT, IS WHAT WE NEED, A

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